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March 11, 1988

JUDGE:

You will be addressing the American Business Conference, an audience of top chief executive officers at 9:30 a.m. on March 23 in Washington, D.C. Between 80 and 90 of the 100 members are expected to attend. This group may be interested in remarks similar to those that were so well received by the A.B. Laffer group. Those remarks, delivered March 3, were titled "CIA, Foreign Policy, and Congress."

I have attached remarks for you to present to the American Business Conference that incorporate the changes you made in the Laffer speech. These include a new transition on page 9 ("I've been talking a good deal about disclosures in the oversight process. Now I'd like to say a few words about secrecy."); a revised conclusion; and an additional reference to the increased interest in CIA employment after campus demonstrations--"Our recruitment centers are inundated with resumes after campus demonstrations. But we're not responsible for the campus demonstrations." This brought a laugh on March 3.

The section on the laws that govern intelligence activities has been updated to include your views on the Cohen and Stokes legislation. This information was part of your testimony to the SSCI on November 20, 1987; and the HPSCI on February 24, 1988.

There are minor changes in the introduction of this speech to reflect the economic interests of the American Business Conference, but the thesis of the speech is the same -- "Specifically, I want to discuss the role that the CIA plays in supporting and implementing foreign policy -- which is not the same as making policy -- and I also want to discuss how the CIA's relationship with Congress has changed since the days before legislated Congressional oversight."

Your proposed remarks are attached.

Bill Baker

Attachments:

As stated

PROPOSED REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE
AMERICAN BUSINESS CONFERENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MARCH 23, 1988

GOOD MORNING.

WE HAVE ALL RECENTLY HEARD PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES FROM BOTH PARTIES PRESENT THEIR VIEWS OF WHAT IS NEEDED TO FIX JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING--FROM INTERNATIONAL TRADE TO THE FEDERAL DEFICIT TO FOREIGN POLICY. IT IS NOT MY ROLE AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TO AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THEIR VIEWS. I HAVE MY OWN OPINIONS, AS YOU DO. I'M SURE MANY IN THIS AUDIENCE HAVE PRESCRIPTIONS FOR BOLSTERING U.S. TRADE AND REDUCING THE FEDERAL DEFICIT. FOR TODAY, I WILL LEAVE THOSE TOPICS TO YOU. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY SOME OF THOSE ISSUES THAT SURROUND THE FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE.

SPECIFICALLY, I WANT TO DISCUSS THE ROLE THAT THE CIA PLAYS IN SUPPORTING AND IMPLEMENTING FOREIGN POLICY--WHICH IS NOT THE SAME AS MAKING POLICY--AND I ALSO WANT TO DISCUSS HOW THE CIA'S RELATIONSHIP

WITH CONGRESS HAS CHANGED SINCE THE DAYS BEFORE LEGISLATED CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.

THE CIA'S PRIMARY ROLE IS TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO OUR NATION'S POLICYMAKERS. WE DO THAT BY PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE THAT IS USEFUL, TIMELY, AND OBJECTIVE.

TODAY OUR GOVERNMENT DEPENDS HEAVILY ON USEFUL, ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE. INTELLIGENCE TO FORMULATE AND IMPLEMENT OUR FOREIGN POLICY, INTELLIGENCE TO VERIFY THE ARMS AGREEMENTS THAT WE HAVE SIGNED, AND INTELLIGENCE TO UNDERSTAND BOTH THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THE INTENTIONS OF OUR ADVERSARIES. I HAVE RECENTLY TESTIFIED BEFORE CONGRESS ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S ABILITY TO MONITOR THE SOVIET UNION'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE INF TREATY. WHILE I CANNOT DISCUSS DETAILS HERE, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT INTELLIGENCE IS VITAL IN THIS AREA.

INTELLIGENCE MUST ALSO BE TIMELY. LAST SUMMER I VISITED NORAD IN COLORADO SPRINGS, WHICH IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL EARLY WARNING

SYSTEMS FOR OUR COUNTRY'S NATIONAL DEFENSE. A DAY THERE CAN'T HELP BUT MAKE ONE AWARE OF THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF EARLY AND ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE FOR OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE. GIVEN THE SPEED AT WHICH NUCLEAR MISSILES ARE ABLE TO TRAVEL, WHEN WE THINK IN TERMS OF SURVIVAL WARNINGS, WE THINK NOT IN TERMS OF DAYS OR WEEKS, BUT MINUTES.

NOT ONLY MUST INTELLIGENCE BE USEFUL AND TIMELY, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE INFORMATION THAT IS COLLECTED BE DEVELOPED IN AN OBJECTIVE WAY. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE PEOPLE WHO ANALYZE INFORMATION MUST BE SEEN AS GIVING THE BEST ESTIMATES, NOT TO "COOK THE BOOKS" OR TO SHAPE OR INFLUENCE POLICY, BUT TO PROVIDE POLICYMAKERS WITH THE KIND OF INFORMATION UPON WHICH THEY CAN MAKE WISE DECISIONS IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.

BECAUSE THE QUALITY AND OBJECTIVITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE WE PROVIDE IS SO IMPORTANT, I HAVE TAKEN A NUMBER OF STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PRESERVES ITS OBJECTIVITY AND

PROTECTS ITS INTEGRITY. WE HAVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO "TELL IT LIKE IT IS," AVOIDING BIAS AS MUCH AS WE CAN. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, POLICYMAKERS MAY NOT LIKE THE MESSAGE THEY HEAR FROM US, ESPECIALLY IF THEY HAVE A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW. MY POSITION IS THAT IN THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WE WILL PROVIDE THEM FOR THE USE OF POLICYMAKERS. THEY CAN BE USED IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THEY CAN BE IGNORED, TORN UP, OR THROWN AWAY, BUT THEY MAY NOT BE CHANGED.

LET ME GIVE YOU AN EXAMPLE. IN JUNE, 1987, WE PROVIDED A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE TO THE POLICY COMMUNITY ON IRAN AND THE SUPERPOWERS IN THE GULF. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE REPRESENTED THE COORDINATED VIEWS OF MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, BUT THE POSITION WAS NOT A POPULAR ONE. THIS ESTIMATE ASSESSED NOT ONLY THE PROBABLE IMMEDIATE ACTIONS THAT IRAN WOULD TAKE IN AN EFFORT TO HEAD OFF THE PROPOSED U.S. PROTECTION FOR KUWAITI SHIPPING, BUT ALSO THE PROBABLE IRANIAN STRATEGY ONCE THE REFLAGGING PROJECT WAS

IMPLEMENTED. ALTHOUGH OUR VIEW WAS NOT ONE THAT THE POLICY COMMUNITY WELCOMED, WE DID NOT CHANGE IT.

I THINK THIS KIND OF INSISTENCE ON OBJECTIVITY MAY BE ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS THAT I COULD MAKE IN GALVANIZING A COHESIVE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE INTEGRITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL ANALYSTS OR PROGRAM MANAGERS.

IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE THAT IS USEFUL, TIMELY, AND OBJECTIVE, THE CIA PLAYS A ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING FOREIGN POLICY. THIS IS DONE THROUGH ITS COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS. THESE MAY INCLUDE POLITICAL WORK THROUGH COMMUNICATIONS--GETTING THE MESSAGE OUT--TRAINING, SUPPLYING IMPORTANT MATERIALS FOR THOSE WHO NEED SUPPORT, AND GIVING ADVICE. ALTHOUGH COVERT ACTION IS NOT DEFINED BY LAW, THE TERM HAS COME TO BE UNDERSTOOD TO REFER TO ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL POLICY IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS NOT APPARENT.

COVERT CAPABILITY, ESSENTIAL IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY, PROVIDES NEEDED SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, OFTEN PROVIDES SUPPORT TO

GOVERNMENTS, AND ALLOWS US TO WORK IN COLLABORATION WITH THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHO DO NOT WISH, FOR LEGITIMATE POLITICAL REASONS OF THEIR OWN, TO HAVE THE U.S. ROLE AND INVOLVEMENT PUBLICLY KNOWN.

FROM PRESIDENT FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT FORWARD, EVERY PRESIDENT IN MY LIFETIME HAS ENDORSED AND USED COVERT ACTION TO SUPPORT THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THIS COUNTRY. ALTHOUGH COVERT ACTIONS TRADITIONALLY CLAIM ONLY A VERY SMALL PORTION OF THE CIA'S RESOURCES (LESS THAN 3%) THEY ARE THE FOCUS OF THE GREATEST CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC ATTENTION.

AND CONGRESS IS VERY INTERESTED IN WHAT THE CIA DOES. I RECENTLY ADDRESSED A GROUP OF RETIRED INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AND THEY RECALLED THE DAYS WHEN NO CLASSIFIED PAPERS WENT FROM THE CIA TO EITHER BRANCH OF CONGRESS AND THE ONLY CLASSIFIED BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES WERE GIVEN BY THE DIRECTOR HIMSELF, OR WITH THE DIRECTOR PRESENT. AT ONE TIME, THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE HAD ONE CLEARED STAFFER, THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ONE OR TWO. ¹ TODAY, FOUR CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

CLOSELY EXAMINE THE AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES, AND THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS WHO SEE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL FAR EXCEEDS THE ONE OR TWO OF THE PAST.

FIFTEEN YEARS AGO THE CIA GAVE 175 BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESS: LAST YEAR WE GAVE OVER 1,000 BRIEFINGS ON A VARIETY OF TOPICS. THESE TOPICS INCLUDED ARMS CONTROL, SOVIET WEAPONS, THE PERSIAN GULF SITUATION, AND CONFLICT IN CENTRAL AMERICA.² WE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON TOPICS OF CURRENT INTEREST TO CONGRESS, BUT WE ALSO LIKE TO ANTICIPATE THE INFORMATION CONGRESS AND THE POLICY COMMUNITY WILL NEED IN THE FUTURE. WE PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION IN THE FORM OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OR RESEARCH PAPERS. VIRTUALLY ALL CIA ASSESSMENTS GO TO THE TWO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES. MOST ALSO GO TO THE APPROPRIATIONS, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND ARMS SERVICES COMMITTEES. EIGHT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES GET THE CIA'S DAILY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT.³ IN THE LAST YEAR THE CIA SENT MORE THAN 5,000 INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS.⁴

IN ADDITION TO BRIEFINGS AND PAPERS, WE ALSO TESTIFY BEFORE CONGRESS. I HAVE SPENT A FAIR AMOUNT OF TIME ON THE HILL, LATELY, MYSELF. BECAUSE I KNOW OF THE NEED TO BE ABSOLUTELY CANDID WITH CONGRESS, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS HAVE TO PROTECT SOURCES AND METHODS, I HAVE ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES GOVERNING OUR DEALINGS WITH CONGRESS. AND I HAVE MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT IN DEALING WITH CONGRESS THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR DECEPTION.

I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES EXERCISED BY CONGRESS ARE BOTH NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL. THERE MUST BE A DEPENDABLE SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WHICH BUILDS, RATHER THAN ERODES, TRUST BETWEEN THOSE WHO HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY AND THOSE WHO ARE THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

AS PART OF MY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH AN OPEN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CONGRESS, I MEET WITH THE LEADERS OF OUR OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES AT LEAST MONTHLY. IT MIGHT INTEREST YOU TO KNOW WHAT PERCENTAGE OF OUR

SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE HAVE SERVED OR ARE SERVING ON INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES. TWENTY-SIX PERCENT OF THE SENATORS NOW IN THE SENATE HAVE BEEN ON THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE. ONLY FIVE PERCENT OF THOSE NOW SERVING IN THE HOUSE HAVE BEEN ON THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.⁵ THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS I HAVE JUST MENTIONED SHARE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PRESERVING THE NATION'S INTELLIGENCE SECRETS.

I'VE BEEN TALKING A GOOD DEAL ABOUT DISCLOSURES IN THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS. NOW I'D LIKE TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT SECRECY.

IT SEEMS QUITE CLEAR TO ME THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES--EITHER TO COLLECT INFORMATION OR TO CARRY OUT COVERT ACTION--WITHOUT SECRECY.

BOTH CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIARY HAVE RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR SECRECY IN MATTERS OF NATIONAL SECURITY. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF SECRECY IS TO PRESERVE AND PROTECT SOURCES AND METHODS. IF WE

CANNOT PROTECT OUR SOURCES. WE WILL NOT GET THE INFORMATION THAT WE NEED. IF WE CANNOT PROTECT THE SENSITIVE METHODS BY WHICH WE COLLECT THE INFORMATION, BOTH IN TERMS OF INDIVIDUALS ON THE GROUND AND SATELLITES IN SPACE, WE WILL CEASE TO HAVE THE MEANS OF COLLECTING INFORMATION.

SECRECY IS A NECESSARY PART OF EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. BUT IT IS, HISTORICALLY, THAT PART OF INTELLIGENCE THAT HAS GENERATED THE MOST SUSPICION AND DISTRUST. MY GOOD FRIEND, GENERAL VERNON WALTERS, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CIA AND NOW AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, DESCRIBED THE VIEW MANY HAVE NOT ONLY OF SECRECY, BUT OF INTELLIGENCE IN GENERAL. "AMERICANS," HE OBSERVED, "HAVE ALWAYS HAD AN AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARD INTELLIGENCE. WHEN THEY FEEL THREATENED, THEY WANT A LOT OF IT, AND WHEN THEY DON'T, THEY TEND TO REGARD THE WHOLE THING AS SOMEWHAT IMMORAL."

I MENTIONED EARLIER THE NUMBER OF BRIEFINGS AND DOCUMENTS THAT WE PROVIDE CONGRESS YEARLY. WHAT I DID NOT DISCUSS WERE THE LAWS DEFINING THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS AND INTELLIGENCE--THE LAWS THAT TELL US WHAT TO PROVIDE AND WHEN TO PROVIDE IT. I WILL SUMMARIZE THAT FOR YOU NOW.

IN 1976 AND 1977 BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES TO MONITOR ALL SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES. MANY OF THE RULES WHICH GOVERN OUR ACTIVITIES ARE FOUND IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT, THE HUGHES-RYAN AMMENDMENT, AND THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT ACT. THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES, OPERATING UNDER THOSE ACTS, HAVE FORMALIZED THE REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE AND COVERT ACTIONS TO CONGRESS. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS NOW REQUIRED BY LAW TO KEEP THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED OF ALL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. UNDER THE HUGHES-RYAN AMMENDMENT, THE PRESIDENT MUST FIND THAT EACH COVERT ACTION IS IMPORTANT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY BEFORE THE OPERATION CAN BE INITIATED.

UNDER LAW IT IS OUR DUTY TO NOTIFY THE COMMITTEES OF ANY SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. THIS INCLUDES ANY ACTIVITIES REQUIRING A PRESIDENTIAL FINDING. WHEN NECESSARY, THE PRESIDENT CAN LIMIT THAT NOTIFICATION TO THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES, TO THE SPEAKER AND MINORITY LEADER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY LEADER OF THE SENATE--REFERRED TO, IN TRADE PARLANCE, AS THE "GANG OF EIGHT." AND THERE IS ANOTHER STATUTORY REQUIREMENT. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES MUST BE FULLY INFORMED IN A "TIMELY FASHION" OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS FOR WHICH PRIOR NOTICE WAS NOT GIVEN--AND THE PRESIDENT MUST STATE THE REASONS FOR NOT GIVING PRIOR NOTICE IN THOSE INSTANCES.

JUST WHAT CONSTITUTES "TIMELY" IS A MATTER OF CONCERN. THE HOUSE AND SENATE ARE NOW CONSIDERING LEGISLATION THAT WOULD REQUIRE NOTIFICATION OF A SPECIAL ACTIVITY TO CONGRESS WITHIN 48 HOURS OF A PRESIDENTIAL FINDING. I OPPOSE THIS, BECAUSE I BELIEVE SOME

ALLOWANCE MUST BE MADE FOR THAT RARE CASE WHERE LIMITED DELAY IN CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION IS CRITICAL TO PRESERVE THE ABSOLUTE SECURITY OF AN OPERATION -- WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, LIVES ARE AT STAKE. IN ADDITION, SUCH LEGISLATION IS UNNECESSARY BECAUSE A NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE ALREADY REQUIRES THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP TO REEVALUATE, AT LEAST EVERY TEN DAYS, A DECISION TO DELAY CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF A GIVEN FINDING.⁶ FURTHER, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BELIEVES THAT IT IS NOT ENOUGH JUST FOR THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A FINDING AUTHORIZING AND DIRECTING US TO TAKE SOME COVERT ACTION. BEFORE SUBMITTING THE PROPOSAL TO THE PRESIDENT, WE IN INTELLIGENCE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO DETERMINE THAT IT CAN BE DONE. AND DONE IN A LAWFUL WAY. AND WE MUST BE SURE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE OUT ON THE FIRING LINE, OUTSIDE THE PROTECTION OF OUR CONSTITUTION AND OUR LAWS, IN MANY INSTANCES, CAN DO THEIR WORK WITH THE FLEXIBILITY THAT THEY NEED, AND WITH THE CLEAREST UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE CIA AND TO THE COUNTRY.

ALTHOUGH IT IS DANGEROUS TO PREDICT ANYTHING IN AN ELECTION YEAR, I WILL SPEND A MOMENT CONSIDERING THE CHANGES THAT ARE OCCURRING IN INTELLIGENCE AND THE KIND OF INFORMATION WE WILL BE PROVIDING CONGRESS AND THE POLICY COMMUNITY IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

THERE HAS BEEN A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN THE NUMBER AND DIVERSITY OF SUBJECTS THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS REQUIRED TO ADDRESS. WHILE MUCH OF OUR EFFORT IS STILL FOCUSED ON THE SOVIET UNION, WE ARE SPENDING MORE TIME AND RESOURCES COLLECTING INFORMATION ON THIRD WORLD NATIONS. WE ARE INTERESTED IN BOTH THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY OF COUNTRIES FROM BRAZIL TO BANGLADESH, FROM MEXICO TO MALAYSIA, AND FROM TURKEY TO TANZANIA. WE ARE ALSO CONCENTRATING ON INTERDISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS SUCH AS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.

WE BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION'S APPETITE FOR AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY IS GROWING, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY. THE SOVIET STRATEGY APPEARS TO BE MODERNIZING THE ELECTRONICS-BASED

SECTOR OF THE ECONOMY BEFORE MOVING TO INVEST MORE HEAVILY, IN THE 1990'S, IN MILITARY PRODUCTION FACILITIES. WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SOVIET INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE WILL INTENSIFY IN THE NEXT DECADE. AND THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO DEVOTE WHATEVER RESOURCES AND MANPOWER ARE NECESSARY TO FULFILL THEIR MOST CRITICAL MILITARY COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS.⁷

ISSUES LIKE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER HAVE CHANGED OUR OWN COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS. THAT'S WHY WE MUST CONTINUE TO ATTRACT TOP PEOPLE TO HELP US. WE ARE FORTUNATE IN THAT LAST YEAR, OVER 100,000 MEN AND WOMEN EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN WORKING FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. YOU HAVE NO DOUBT READ ABOUT THE PROTESTS ON SOME COLLEGE CAMPUSES WHEN CIA RECRUITS. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, THESE PROTESTS AND THE PUBLICITY THEY GENERATE OFTEN WORK IN OUR FAVOR. OUR RECRUITMENT CENTERS ARE INUNDATED WITH RESUMES AFTER CAMPUS DEMONSTRATIONS. BUT WE'RE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CAMPUS DEMONSTRATIONS.

I HOPE THAT WE CONTINUE TO ATTRACT THOSE BEST SUITED TO CARRY OUT OUR MISSION--THOSE WHO ARE RISK TAKERS BUT NOT RISK SEEKERS, PEOPLE WHO ARE DEDICATED AND RESPONSIVE TO OUR LAW AND DISCIPLINE, PEOPLE WHO UNDERSTAND AND PLAY BY THE RULES. PEOPLE TO WHOM FAME AND FORTUNE IS NOT PARTICULARLY A NECESSARY PART OF THEIR LIFE, BUT WHO CAN FIND IN OUR WORK AN AVENUE TO PURSUE THEIR HIGHEST ASPIRATIONS FOR A SAFER AND BETTER WORLD.

WITH SUCH PEOPLE WE CAN CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE THAT POLICYMAKERS NEED, OBSERVING THE RULES OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY THAT BOTH THE CONGRESS AND THE MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT. THIS IS WHAT YOU WOULD WANT OF US, WHAT ALL AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD WANT OF US, AND WE ARE DOING OUR VERY BEST TO SUPPLY IT.

THANK YOU.

FOOTNOTES

¹ This information on the very limited access Congress once had to classified information is from a letter Ambassador Richard Helms sent to the Central Intelligence Retirees Association (CIRA) on 22 January 1988. Judge Webster also used this information in his remarks to CIRA on 8 February 1988.

² Statistics on the number of briefings the CIA gives to Congress and the topics covered is from a presentation by John Helgerson, director of the Office of Congressional Affairs, on 19 February 1988 at CIA Headquarters. Mr. Helgerson addressed the "Friends of Analysis," a group of analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence.

³ Information on congressional recipients of CIA assessments and the Agency's daily national intelligence report was drawn from an unclassified article by Robert M. Gates, "The CIA and American Foreign Policy," which appeared in the fall, 1987 issue of Studies in Intelligence.

STAT ⁴ The number of CIA intelligence reports sent to Congress in 1987 was confirmed by [] an information officer with the Office of Congressional Affairs.

⁵ The percentages of House and Senate members who have served or are currently serving on the congressional intelligence committees were mentioned by John Helgerson during his talk to the "Friends of Analysis" group on 19 February.

⁶ Remarks concerning the Stokes and Cohen bills on congressional oversight were drawn from Judge Webster's testimony before the SSCI on November 20, 1987 and the HPSCI on February 24, 1988.

⁷ Information on the growing Soviet appetite for American technology was drawn from a speech on technology transfer delivered by Robert M. Gates to the American Electronics Association on 16 February 1988.